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Numerous political commentators have proclaimed the rapid proliferation of 
information and communications technology (ICT) as the harbinger of instability to 
undemocratic governments. But does the spread of ICT necessarily destabilize 
authoritarian regimes, and does it impact different types of autocracies to the same 
degree? To determine the effect of ICT on governments, this study adopts a quantitative 
approach. The relationship between state stability and ICT penetration in countries from 
1990 to 2013 is examined using logistic regression techniques. The results of the analysis 
indicate a statistically significant negative relationship between the onset of violence and 
ICT presence. Authoritarian regimes, specifically those with institutionalized succession 
regimes, such as monarchies and one-party states, appear to experience less violence as 
ICT levels increase, whereas stability changes only marginally in democratic countries. 
Governments and individuals may utilize ICT in disparate manners in pursuit of opposing 
objectives, but the spread of ICT to authoritarian regimes seems to favor existing 
institutions rather than the populace. To better understand the relationship between the 
stability of authoritarian regimes and ICT penetration, it is recommended that future 
research blend qualitative analysis with an examination of more specific elements of ICT. 
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The revolution will not be tweeted. 
– Malcolm Gladwell, October 4, 2010 
 
The revolution will be tweeted. 
– Blake Hounshell, June 20, 2011 
 
At first glance, it appears that author Malcom Gladwell grievously underestimated 
the destabilizing power of social media, while political commentator Blake Hounshell 
astutely understood the nature of events unfolding before his eyes in the Middle East. The 
Arab Spring was quite possibly a watershed moment in the relationship between 
authoritarian regimes and their citizens. Initiated in December 2010, with the self-
immolation of Tunisian Mohammed Bouazizi and subsequent anti-government protests, 
the Arab Spring engulfed large portions of the Middle East, swiftly toppling two long-
standing regimes and destabilizing several other governments. If Bouazizi was the 
corporeal catalyst for social revolution, then Wael Ghonim was the movement’s chief 
spokesman and manager, harnessing the organizational power of social media, especially 
Facebook, to develop ideas and mobilize individuals (El-Baradei, 2011). Yet, while the 
effects of the Arab Spring continue to reverberate across the region, the full promise of 
social media did not materialize, as toppled regimes did not necessarily give way to 
democratic institutions, nor did the revolutions seem to materialize significantly beyond 
the Middle East. 
With the rise and spread of information and communications technology (ICT), 
social media, a prominent subset of this modern, networked paradigm, has generated 
myriad conjectures and hypotheses regarding its social impact. The term ICT covers 
many now-ubiquitous items of modern life, such as laptops, mobile phones, pagers, and 
any device networked to another or directly to the Internet. These technologies have 
changed the nature of social interaction by fundamentally increasing the speed and 
organizational capacity of information flow within networks. Indeed, the potential to 
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harness ICT for social change occurred long before the events of the Arab Spring 
materialized. 
In 1996, John Perry Barlow posted a cyber utopian manifesto: “Declaration of 
Independence of Cyberspace.” Directed at national governments, specifically the United 
States, he described the Internet as, “naturally independent of the tyrannies you seek to 
impose on us,” further exhorting, “we are creating a world where anyone, anywhere may 
express his or her beliefs, no matter how singular, without fear of being coerced into 
silence or conformity” (Barlow, 1996). Another similar early theory posited that ICT 
would herald the end of authoritarian governments through the empowerment of 
disadvantaged populations (Ellis, 1999). Nearly two decades later (and nearly half a 
decade removed from the initial events of the Arab Spring) these visions have yet to 
reach fruition. Indeed, the Internet and mobile devices have served as powerful tools for 
gathering data, transmitting messages, and organizing action, but they provide utility to 
both citizens and governments. 
As is often the case, the truth regarding correlation and causation proves difficult 
to untangle. Some authoritarian regimes, such as Tunisia and Egypt, succumbed to the 
demands imposed by citizens empowered through ICT, but other regimes, like Saudi 
Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Jordan, have proven remarkably resilient. The People’s 
Republic of China (PRC) exhibits extremely high levels of ICT penetration; yet, the 
Communist Party of China (CPC), a one-party state, remains unquestionably in control 
and has not suffered any significant challenges to its control. A closer examination of 
other non-democratic states also reveals a disparate variety of governing styles, power 
concentrations, and methods for controlling information (Wahman, Teorell, & Hadenius, 
2013). These variations further complicate the role and importance of ICT in modern 
state stability. To better determine and understand the relationship between stability 
within authoritarian regimes and the spread of ICT among populations, it is necessary to 
conduct a macro-level quantitative analysis of available, relevant data. Through this 
method we examine the following question: What effect does increasing access to 
information from the spread of information and communications technology (ICT) have 
on state stability in different types of authoritarian regimes? 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW: UNPACKING THE NATURE OF 
THE QUESTION 
It is necessary to unpack this question into smaller areas of research, identifying 
the most relevant theories. There exist two main schools of thought regarding 
authoritarian governments, their resistance to destabilizing threats, and the effects of 
increased access to information afforded by ICT. There is also a developing body of 
literature that attempts to classify authoritarian regimes into distinct categories. Taken 
together, the understanding of the various viewpoints present a clearer picture of the 
effects of the digital revolution on different types of autocracies. 
A. ACCESS TO INFORMATION 
Cyber utopianism arose as the first major camp to study the effects of ICT on 
authoritarian regimes, with cyber-realism developing later as a reaction to the former 
(Morozov, 2012). A significant amount of the literature views the spread of ICT as an 
unstoppable democratizing force, which can be delayed but never defeated (Lagerkvist, 
2010). Adherents of this school of thought hold that the power of ICT to facilitate social 
connectivity allows for the creation of new political sociologies, with which authoritarian 
regimes must continually contend (Cunningham, 2013). 
Cyber utopianism tends to focus on the population’s access to information within 
authoritarian regimes. The underlying tenant of cyber utopianism asserts that 
improvements to communication abilities provided by ICT will cause an increase in the 
number of democratic governments around the world. According to the theory, there are 
several reasons why non-democratic regimes will be unable to survive in a connected 
world. First, spreading information critical of a government is greatly simplified through 
modern ICT as compared to printed media, radio, and even television, all of which have 
relatively high startup costs, and are relatively easy to centrally control. Second, 
interpersonal network development is facilitated because the Internet allows interactions 
between groups that are geographically and socially separated. Third, non-governmental 
groups can easily and quickly leverage mobile technology to coordinate the activities of 
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large numbers of people. Finally, the rapid pace of technological advancement will 
continually outpace regime efforts to censor and control information. All of these factors 
make cyber utopianism a popular school of thought among certain audiences, especially 
American political and technological circles (Tkacheva et al., 2013). According to 
proponents of cyber utopianism, then, the following hypotheses may be offered: 
H1: Owing to the destabilizing influences of ICT, authoritarian regimes will 
attempt to restrict ICT into their jurisdictions; and 
H2: Increasing levels of ICT within authoritarian regimes will create 
correspondingly increasing levels of instability. 
Cyber-realism, on the other hand, places greater emphasis on country-specific 
factors, allowing for a more nuanced view in which authoritarian regimes may leverage 
ICT to maintain power indefinitely. This school of thought is less well-defined, but it 
encompasses a broad rejection of the often-unsupported cyber utopian notions for a more 
nuanced country-by-country approach in which ICT may favor the state over the 
population (Morozov, 2012). Proponents of this theory have developed numerous counter 
arguments to the tenants of cyber-utopianism while retaining the premise that access to 
information may serve as a threat to regime stability. They argue that there are two main 
techniques used by authoritarian governments to counter-act possible instability caused 
by ICT: outright control or limits on technology, and selective censorship. 
Outright control or prohibition of ICT is the first major tactic employed by 
authoritarian governments. The most extreme contemporary example is the Democratic 
People’s Republic of North Korea (DPRK), which physically modifies all television and 
radio receivers to receive only government broadcasts (Kretchun & Kim, 2012). Very 
few North Koreans even have access to the Internet and cellular phones were completely 
banned until 2008. In less totalitarian situations, regimes often maintain control, directly 
or indirectly, of the physical infrastructure of ICT; thus, they can simply shut-off servers 
and networks. The governments of Iran and Syria used this technique extensively in 2009 
and during the Syrian civil war, respectively (Howard & Hussain, 2013). 
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The second major approach taken by authoritarian regimes toward ICT is to co-
opt content to facilitate repression. The global debate regarding content encryption 
continues, but it currently favors a state’s desire for invasive access over individual 
privacy (Schneier, 2015). Thus, networking programs and websites remain vulnerable to 
state security personnel who use software to identify dissidents, sometimes even if the 
ICT infrastructure is not under direct state control. Authoritarian regimes, such as the 
CPC, have used and continue to use, selective censoring to control and direct collective 
action to minimize the danger to state stability (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013). Many 
technology companies, wittingly or not, even accept contracts from authoritarian regimes 
to maintain their corporate filtering and surveillance technology on the cutting edge 
(Gobel, 2013; Risen, 2015). While there exist many factions within the cyber realist camp 
that tend towards utopianism in the long term (Lagerkvist, 2010), the short term favors a 
more balanced, refined outlook whereby ICT are merely tools ready for use by 
governments and citizens (Rød & Weidmann, 2015). Thus, proponents of cyber realism 
may propose the following alternate hypotheses: 
H3: Owing to ease of control over ICT infrastructure, authoritarian regimes will 
not inhibit the spread of ICT into their domains; and 
H4: Increasing levels of ICT within authoritarian regimes will decrease levels of 
instability, at least in the short-term. 
B. AUTHORITARIANISM 
While many of the world’s approximately 195 countries may fit into any number 
of broad, artificial categories, they are often ordered on a spectrum of political 
participation. At one end of the spectrum, either one or a small number of people in the 
country are involved in political participation (authoritarian). On the other end, most or 
all of a country’s population are permitted to participate in political decisions 
(democracy). Analysts have attempted to differentiate the subset of authoritarian 
governments further into even more distinct categories. These categories were devised for 
various reasons, including the ability to measure factors like state stability, efficiency, 
and chances of democratic transition (Wahman et al., 2013). Categorization schemes 
 6 
create certain generalizations with most forced to classify regimes with characteristics 
belonging to multiple categories or whose characteristics have changed over time into a 
single type.  
Current academic research separates authoritarian regimes into a range of three to 
six categories based on different criteria (Geddes, 1999; Wahman et al., 2013). Several of 
these works analyze data compiled by the Center for Systemic Peace (CSP), which 
provides a numerical ranking (polity score) based on measurements of political 
participation, checks on executive power, and political competition. Most categorization 
systems concern themselves with how power is originally acquired (Hadenious, 2013), 
but some rely solely on the method of political change (Diamond, 2002; Cheibub, 2010, 
Goldstone et al., 2010). Almost all models include military regimes as one of their major 
types. Thailand, for example, is considered a military regime, following the events of the 
2014 coup (Whitlock, 2015), because national power is held exclusively by the military. 
Three of the four most prominent models also contain a category for monarchies or royal 
dictatorships (Geddes et al., 2012; Cheibub et al., 2010; Diamond, 2002), with Oman and 
Saudi Arabia serving as contemporary examples. One of the simplest models defines 
regime types other than military dictatorships and monarchies as civilian dictatorships 
(Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2010), while one of the most complicated models 
differentiates between military dictatorship, monarchy, no party, one party, limited multi-
party, and hybrid (Wahman et al., 2013), for a total of six, with exceptions. A unique and 
competing system developed by Larry Diamond contains four categories based on the 
mechanism of power transfer: hegemonic electoral authoritarians, politically closed 
authoritarianism, competitive authoritarians, and ambiguous regimes (Diamond, 2002). 
One of the research fields associated with authoritarian regime categorization 
considers how different government types respond to opposition. One particular study of 
all authoritarian regimes since 1946 (Geddes, 1999) determined that when confronted by 
powerful resistance movements, military regimes tended to cede power, personal 
dictatorships resisted until they were violently overthrown, and one-party regimes 
endured the longest. The latter regime type often used co-option of the opposition as a 
successful tactic to extend the government’s reign. 
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Lastly with regards to government types, Diamond and others have noticed a 
change in the prevalence of certain types of regimes that fall short of the full democracy 
classification (Diamond, 2002). His work emphasized that politically closed 
authoritarianism is becoming rare since the fall of the Soviet Union. While contemporary 
examples, such as Kazakhstan, the PRC, and the DPRK certainly still exist, the last 20 
years have seen an increase in the number of states which fall in the middle of the range 
between liberal democracy and politically closed authoritarianism. Diamond also points 
out that military dictatorships have all but disappeared except as a transitional 
government type, although there are several governments, especially in South East Asia, 
with large levels of military government involvement (Diamond, 2002). These states 
often create facades of popular participation; but elections are either rigged or mostly 
ignored, the rule of law is not respected, and individual freedoms are restricted (Pletsch, 
Miller, & Karp, 2014). 
Few works appear to directly and exclusively address how different types of 
authoritarian regimes respond to the increasing ubiquity and pervasiveness of ICT. There 
is, however, an increasing body of work regarding ICT effects on conflict, to include 
propagation and suppression (Dafoe & Lyall, 2015; Pierskalla & Hollenbach, 2013; 
Warren, 2014, 2015). Numerous case studies have examined one, two, or three different 
countries, but not in a systematic, quantitative manner (Whitlock, 2015; Ellis, 1999; 
Hess, 2013). A large body of material focuses on the PRC (King, Pan, & Roberts, 2013; 
Kalathil & Boas, 2001; Lagerkvist, 2010; McAfee, 2013; Mengin, 2004) for use in case 
studies. Very few analysts focus on broad-spectrum qualitative and quantitative research 
regarding access to information and the types of authoritarian regimes that must contend 
with the burgeoning ICT phenomenon (Rød & Weidmann, 2015). Determining if and 
how increasing access to information from the spread of ICT creates different levels of 
instability in different types of authoritarian regimes is the next important step along this 
line of inquiry. 
The underlying assumption behind this line of research is that faster and more 
efficient one-to-one and many-to-many communications decreases the ability of some 
types of authoritarian regimes to control their populations. In fact, governments of all 
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types across the world appear to consider this notion axiomatic; the existence, budgets, 
and activities of agencies such as the United States National Security Agency and the 
Russian Federation Federal Security Service seem to confirm this belief. But why do they 
assume that this is the case? Some of the interconnected theories underpinning this 
research point to the ideas that a more connected populace will demand greater political 
participation, challenge the state’s monopoly on violence, or spread unofficial narratives 
against regime positions (Gobel, 2013; Warren, 2015). 
The idea of influence through soft power or narratives using ICT is a growing 
field of research (Warren, 2015) that acknowledges that the ability for one node on a 
network to instantly communicate with multiple other nodes was previously reserved 
solely for radio and television broadcasters. Internet-connected computers or the Short 
Message Service (SMS) function on modern cellular phones allows rapid dissemination 
of messages in near real time. Prior to the emergence and maturity of these technologies 
around 1990, shaping a population’s perception of an event or situation required either 
physical proximity, television or radio dissemination, or time. Additionally, so-called old 
media remains a useful tool to disseminate official propaganda, but it does not provide 
the direct feedback to institutional entities that ICT enables. Some types of regimes may 
prove more adept at confronting the novel challenges posed by ICT than others. 
All regimes erect institutions to legitimize and maintain power. Basic forms of 
governmental institutions include military, security and police forces, wealth 
redistribution systems, health providers, and sanitation organizations. Countries differ in 
the degree to which the government controls these institutions; the contrast between 
democracies and autocracies is as extensive as the differences between their succession 
mechanisms. Most modern democracies have robust, institutionalized succession 
mechanisms that entail free, open, and fixed election cycles, including term limits for 
their leaders. Some types of authoritarian regimes also institutionalize succession 
mechanisms but many have not. For instance, the CPC, a one-party state, regularly 
convenes its National People’s Congress every five years and transfers power every ten. 
Monarchies arguably institute the strongest and most clear power transition mechanism: 
hereditary succession, transferring power upon the leader’s death or incapacitation. On 
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the other hand, most personal dictatorships do not formalize succession mechanisms, 
often only signaling a successor near the end of a reign due to failing health or 
insurrection. Military regimes typically do not have resilient institutionalized succession 
mechanisms, behaving much like personal dictatorships or developing ad hoc 
governmental instruments to transition to other forms of governance, such as democracy, 
as recently observed in Pakistan, Egypt, and Myanmar. 
Evidence suggests that authoritarian regimes with more robust institutionalized 
succession mechanisms, such as those commonly associated with one-party states and 
monarchies, tend to survive longer than those without, such as personal and military 
dictatorships (Geddes, 1999). The manner in which these four broad types of 
governments prepare for succession directly influences their ability to manage and resist 
opposition. Without institutionalized succession mechanisms, opposition forces in 
personal dictatorships are left with two glaring choices regarding regime change: waiting 
for the leader to die of natural causes, or overthrowing the leader, usually through violent 
means. One-party states are much more capable of adapting to opposition forces because 
they have institutional mechanisms that allow for the possibility of change. This type of 
government also allows for the cooption of opposition members into the party, something 
much more easily achievable in one-party states as compared to military regimes and 
personal dictatorships (Geddes, 1999). 
This adaptability and propensity for cooption exhibited by regimes with 
institutionalized succession mechanisms may prove advantageous as ICT permeates their 
societies. ICT confers benefits to both opposition forces and governments. The alluring 
prospects for change that social media platforms have offered to anti-government 
protestors, such as those that occurred during the Arab Spring, may embolden such forces 
confronting regime types that do not have formal mechanisms for power transference. To 
these opposition forces, ICT may provide the organization with the capacity to rally and 
direct violence toward oppressive regimes that offer no alternative. Citizens in one-party 
regimes will be afforded this same ability in the presence of ICT, but opposition groups 
may have a greater propensity to channel their desire for change into existing 
mechanisms. One-party regimes employ ICT both overtly and surreptitiously to gather 
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feedback, to direct opposition away from violence and toward the institutionalized 
platforms of power transition, and to monitor dissidents (King et al., 2013). Taken 
together, the increased capabilities provided by modern technologies and the greater 
structural adaptability of authoritarian regimes with institutionalized succession 
mechanisms (one party states and monarchies), as compared to other authoritarian regime 
types, leads to a final hypothesis: 
H5: Given their existing institutionalized succession mechanisms and their 
propensity to co-opt opposition forces, one-party regimes and monarchies will 
experience less internal violence, as compared to military and personal dictatorships, in 
the face of rising ICT rates. 
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III. METHODOLOGY AND EMPIRICAL DATA 
A. ANALYTICAL TIME PERIOD 
In order to examine faithfully whether the increasing access to information from 
the spread of ICT creates different levels of instability in different types of authoritarian 
regimes, this study quantitatively examines all countries from 1990 to 2013, but primarily 
focuses on authoritarian states. Data availability for some technologies is a significant 
constraint, but faithful record keeping appears to parallel the global rise of ICT beginning 
in the early 1990s, allowing for a close examination of the initial spread of ICT in both 
individual states and categories of countries. 
B. METHODOLOGICAL STEPS 
The decision to examine multiple countries over an extended period provides 
more broadly applicable conclusions. However, the possibility of achieving results that 
are both statistically significant and reproducible requires development of a focused, 
robust, and systematic research methodology, which itself requires the establishment of 
strict criteria. The study proceeds in a systematic fashion that entails three main steps. 
The first step involves the analysis of ICT penetration and incidents of violence in all 
states. The second step examines this relationship within authoritarian states only, 
including the distinct categorization of regimes. The third step includes robustness checks 
of the analyses completed in steps one and two and an attempt to develop additional 
observable implications to better understand and explain the nature of the relationships 
uncovered in steps one and two. 
1. Choosing and Defining the Variables 
The focus of this quantitative analysis centers on government stability in the face 
of change brought by the spread of ICT; thus, basic units under investigation are 
internationally-recognized, sovereign UN member states. Although there are numerous 
possible variables for a worldwide study, this article focuses on several well-recognized 
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datasets from previous works. These variables are examined using the scientifically 
established format of a dependent variable, an independent variable, and several controls. 
a. Dependent Variable – Regime Stability 
This study’s dependent variable is state stability. Stability is a nebulous condition 
defined and analyzed in myriad different ways by many observers. To reduce ambiguity 
in this study, stability is treated as a function of violence, while related variables serve as 
controls. The initiation of civil conflict, as defined by researchers such as Goldstone 
(Goldstone et al., 2010), is treated in this study as a condition of instability. Small-scale 
events, such as protests, low numbers of civilian deaths, and general dissatisfaction with 
the regime, are not considered conditions of instability in either democratic or 
authoritarian regimes. The University of Uppsala maintains a dataset of conflict that 
meets these simple conditions. The Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) is a record 
of violence defined as a contest between a state and a non-state actor resulting in at least 
25 battle related deaths (University of Uppsala, 2015). Thus, stability is considered a 
binary condition in this study: either a regime is stable, or it is not. In this regard, the 
dependent variable under study, regime stability, is dichotomous. For a given year, states 
that do not experience an onset of internal violence that results in more than 25 deaths 
receive a score of 0. States receive a score of 1 if, for any given year, they do experience 
an onset of violence with greater than 25 associated deaths. The study uses non-linear 
logistic regression techniques because the dependent variable is dichotomous, and the 
onset of violence is very uncommon: it occurs only 267 times out of approximately 5000 
observations. 
b. Independent Variable – ICT Adoption 
The independent variable under scrutiny is the societal penetration of ICT in each 
country. Determining the composition of the ICT variable is imperative. Previous 
attempts to measure the power of information have included media such as television, 
radio, and newspaper (Warren, 2014), but a contemporary study must include new modes 
of information transference. Most analyses use only Internet penetration as the sole 
measure of ICT (Rød & Weidmann, 2015), but other forms exist. Thus, ICT as a term 
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should encompass the prominent technologies of modern communication. The percentage 
of both Internet users and mobile cellular subscriptions within a country are two direct 
indicators of the spread of ICT. The International Telecommunications Union and World 
Bank maintain reliable annual records for both measures on nearly every country from 
approximately 1985 onwards. For this study, measures of Internet availability and 
cellular penetration are combined to form the social media index (SMI) as a proxy for 
ICT: 
SMI = Cell + Internet 
 
The SMI attempts to encapsulate the extent to which ICT is available and 
accessible to civilians of any particular state. The number of mobile cellular phone 
subscriptions per 100 people (Cell) and the number of people per 100 with access to the 
Internet (Internet) combine equally to form the SMI term. The data underlying both Cell 
and Internet is imperfect as some individuals may have multiple cellular subscriptions 
and use both media to communicate both at home and at work. However, the SMI term is 
not bounded in order to permit a relative measure of ICT penetration among different 
countries during the same year or the same country over time. The value of this variable 
begins at 0 in most countries in 1990. The exclusion of so-called ‘old media’ in the SMI 
term is intended to focus analysis on the modern, social media technologies and their 
relationship to state stability. 
c. Control Variables 
To account for factors other than ICT that influence state stability (Hendrix, 
2010), several variables commonly associated with socioeconomic development are 
added as controls. These controls include gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, total 
population, rural population, mountainous terrain, and ethnic fractionalization. GDP per 
capita often figures prominently in studies of state capacity, usually associating positively 
with levels of state stability. Fearon and Laitin (2013) assert that GDP per capita relates 
negatively to civil war onset, as it is a measure of a state’s capacity to wield its monopoly 
of violence, while Collier and Hoeffler (2004) find a similar relationship, but interpret it 
to mean that GDP per capita reflects a state’s capacity to compete for personnel 
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resources. Total population and rural population, expressed as a percentage of a state’s 
total population, are included because ICT requires infrastructure, in the form of cable or 
phone lines and cellular towers, which can delay its spread to rural areas. Data regarding 
GDP, total population, and rural population is gathered from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators. 
The mountainous terrain and ethnic fractionalization controls originate from 
values developed by Sambanis’ (2004) civil war database. Mountainous terrain, 
expressed as the percentage of a country’s landmass covered by mountains, may have a 
similar delaying effect on media penetration as does rural population, and it may serve as 
a barrier to effective interstate commerce, communication, and power projection, also 
often giving rise to non-homogeneous areas within a country. The degree of ethnic 
fractionalization within a country, expressed as a percentage, may also be an obstacle to 
strong state control and is intended to account for the existence of identity cleavages 
within society (Warren, 2014). 
d. Classification 
For classification and analysis purposes, each state is assigned an annual ‘polity2’ 
score using data from the CSP’s Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and 
Transitions, 1800–2013, a widely recognized political comparison system. The ‘polity2’ 
score is a revised combined polity score indicated as an integer value on a scale from -10 
to 10 measured as the difference between each country’s democratic and autocratic 
characteristics (CSP, 2015). Democratic countries receive higher positive scores. 
2. Regression Model 
The first step of the analysis employs a non-linear logistic regression to examine 
the relationship between state stability, the presence or absence of civil conflict onset, 
and the spread of ICT. The following is the general form of this study’s non-linear 




A logistic regression (or logit model) is chosen over linear regression techniques 
for several reasons. A logit model accounts for dependent variables that are categorical. 
In this case, as fitting with the conflict database, the dependent variable—stability—is 
dichotomous. The result is binary—a state is either stable or unstable. A linear model 
would not accurately predict the conditions of stability across states because such a 
regression would incorrectly predict states as partially stable, which is not a permissible 
condition of this analysis. In other words, a logistic regression provides a much better fit 
to the binary data points in the form of an S-curve; whereas a linear regression merely 
draws a single, straight line as an approximation between all the data points. 
Each variable, including the controls, is collected in time series format to 
visualize trends. Variables within the models are both discrete and continuous, but SMI, 
in particular, begins at zero, increasing within states only as the Internet and cellular 
phones penetrate the society. As many countries were slow to adopt ICT, the SMI 
variable results in a very right-skewed distribution. Several of the controls also exhibit 
heavy-tailed distributions; thus, the models require applying a logarithmic transformation 
to the SMI, GDP, total population, and mountainous terrain variables. This 
transformation process attempts to account for the strongly skewed distributions of the 
data to approximate the normal distribution, which enables better predictions of the ICT 
and state stability relationship. 
3. ICT and Authoritarian Regimes 
The main models of this study compare the relationship concerning civil conflict 
onset and societal ICT penetration between democratic states and authoritarian regimes, 
and amongst different categories of authoritarian regimes. For general illustrative 
purposes, a binary value is assigned to countries with polity2 ratings. States with ratings 
greater than or equal to 5 on the CSP’s Polity IV Project are deemed strong democracies, 
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while states with ratings of less than or equal to -5 are considered strong autocracies. 
Comparing countries situated at the extreme ends of the polity spectrum allows for broad 
trend analysis. 
Furthermore, to reach the crux of the primary research question, authoritarian 
governments are categorized according to strict criteria to determine if different types of 
regimes perform equally when confronted with similar levels of ICT penetration. Rather 
than conduct detailed qualitative case studies on each of the approximately 100 
authoritarian regimes worldwide, a broader quantitative analysis of these countries may 
identify trends regarding the spread of ICT in restricted environments. Authoritarian 
regimes are categorized using multiple models to include those proposed by Geddes, 
Hadenius, Diamond, and Cheibub (Cheibub, Gandhi, & Vreeland, 2010; Diamond, 2010; 
Geddes, 1999; Wahman, Teorell, & Hadenius, 2013). Datasets associated with these 
studies are available for replication and further research. This study primarily uses the 
four-category model proposed by Geddes (2014), as it serves as a simple, useful, and 
easily understandable model. These four authoritarian regime types are military, 
monarchy, one-party, and personal dictatorship. A state is coded as belonging to one of 
these four categories for each year if its government met Geddes’ (2014) criteria. 
To further test the hypothesis that certain types of authoritarian regimes adapt 
more readily to the challenges presented by SMI (H5), this study also creates a category 
of regimes with institutionalized succession mechanisms. This category includes the 39 
one-party regimes and the eight monarchies from Geddes’ (2014) study for separate 
testing. The term “institutional regime” is also a binary variable for use in the logistic 
regression models. By examining each of these variables in a systematic manner using 
the open source R software, this study arrives at some intriguing conclusions. 
Although the onset of violence in authoritarian regimes remains the primary focus 
of this study, events that result in overall regime change, though much less frequent, can 
provide instructive lessons. Geddes (2014) provides a binary variable labeled regime 
failure (which is used in this study as a broad comparative measure) when one of several 
scenarios occurs. These scenarios include the successful conclusion of a competitive 
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election for the executive, a successful coup or uprising, a marked change in the rules of 
leader selection, or a transition to indirect military rule (Geddes, 2014).  
 18 
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IV. ANALYSIS OF EMPIRICAL DATA 
A. GENERAL RESULTS 
Even before conducting any logistic regressions, a simple line graph of average 
SMI plotted by regime type provides evidence regarding H1 and H3. Figure 1 does not 
support H1 but rather supports its antithesis, H3, which states, owing to ease of control 
over ICT infrastructure, authoritarian regimes will not inhibit the spread of ICT into 
their domains. 
 
Figure 1.  SMI Adoption Rates 
 
Data for Figure 1 obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators and the 
CSP’s Polity IV Project dataset.  
Figure 1 demonstrates that authoritarian regimes have not chosen simply to ban or 
limit access to ICT. While there is a perceptible gap between the early rate of SMI 
adoption between democracies (polity2 score > 5) and authoritarian regimes (polity2 
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score < -5) favoring democracies, by the end of the timeframe studied (2013) 
authoritarian regime ICT rates actually achieve parity with democracies. This initial 
adoption gap is possibly explained by technology origin or by GDP. The blue line 
depicting democracies includes numerous highly developed countries, such as Japan and 
the United States. However, the rapid adoption of ICT by authoritarian regimes coincides 
with the onset of cellular telephone proliferation in the early 21st century in the 
developing world, consisting of numerous autocratic governments, such as Azerbaijan, 
Sudan, and Vietnam. 
B. RESULTS OF THE REGRESSION MODELS 
The overall results of the analysis indicate that as SMI increased across all 
countries, and authoritarian regimes in particular, state stability, measured as the absence 
of civil conflict, increased. These results do not support H2, but they do support its 
contrary hypothesis, H4, which states, increasing levels of ICT within authoritarian 
regimes will decrease levels of instability, at least in the short-term. Table 1 depicts the 
results from the first four logistic models, which use all countries, regardless of their 
regime type classification, for their pool of data. Model 1 serves as the reference model 
without the SMI term, but with the five control variables (GDP, total population, rural 
population, mountainous terrain, and ethnic fractionalization). Strong democracies and 
strong autocracies are also included as terms within models for illustrative purposes. In 
Model 3, the democratic and autocratic categories are removed, replaced by a separate 
category for institutionalized authoritarian regimes. Finally, Model 4 differs from Model 
3 with the inclusion of a term expressed as a multiplicative interaction between the SMI 
variable and institutional authoritarian regimes (monarchies and one-party states). 
Comparing the Akaike information criterion (AIC) scores from Model 1 with the results 
from the models that include the SMI term (models 2, 3, and 4) demonstrates that 
accounting for ICT penetration within society appears to improve the predictive accuracy 
of successive models regarding the onset of violence within countries. 
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Table 1.   Global Regressions – Civil Conflict Onset 
 
                                          Model 1         Model 2        Model 3           Model 4 
SMI   -0.198***   -0.171*** -0.107 
  (0.056) (0.058) (0.066) 
     
GDP   -1.031***   -0.672***   -0.791***   -0.835*** 
 (0.229) (0.242) (0.258) (0.257) 
     
Population    0.880***   0.960***    0.927***    0.929*** 
 (0.113) (0.119) (0.127) (0.128) 
     
Mountains   0.178**   0.163**    0.207***    0.206*** 
 (0.071) (0.072) (0.076) (0.076) 
     
Rural -0.008 -0.007 -0.006 -0.006 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) 
     
Ethnic Frac    1.805***    1.689***    1.803***    1.776*** 
 (0.305) (0.312) (0.320) (0.322) 
     
Democracies    -0.550***   
  (0.174)   
     
Autocracies    -0.648***   
  (0.207)   




  -0.368** -0.434** 
   (0.179) (0.190) 




   -0.266** 
    (0.130) 
     
Constant   -6.295***   -7.579***   -7.442***   -7.300*** 
 (1.195) (1.256) (1.331) (1.327) 
     
 
Observations 3,481 3,413 3,048 3,048 
Log Likelihood -745.867 -713.460 -661.035 -658.851 
Akaike Inf. Crit. 1,503.735 1,444.921 1,338.069 1,335.703 
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Data for Table 1 obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the 
CSP’s Polity IV Project dataset, Sambanis’ (2004) conflict dataset, and Geddes’ (2014) 
regime categorization dataset. 
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Model 2 includes the independent variable, SMI, and each of the five controls. 
SMI, GDP, total population, and mountainous terrain are log transformed to account for 
their long-tailed distributions. This model shows a statistically significant (p < 0.01) 
negative relationship between SMI and the onset of civil conflict (instability). This does 
not support H2, but it does support H4, its antithesis. This model also includes the binary 
variables for strongly democratic and strongly authoritarian regimes. Both of these 
variables have a statistically significant negative relationship with the onset of violence (p 
< 0.01). This result indicates that regardless of regime type, SMI appears to have a 
stabilizing effect on states. 
Model 3 includes the independent variable, SMI, each of the five controls, and a 
variable representing what this study terms institutionalized authoritarian regimes. This 
term combines Geddes’ (Geddes, Wright, & Franz, 2014) categories of monarchies and 
one-party states. Both of these categories behave similarly when modeled, and most 
examples of either regime type provide an institutionalized mechanism for power 
transfer: heredity succession in monarchies and intra-party succession in one-party states. 
When modeled together under the binary institutional variable, they have a significant (p 
< 0.05) negative relationship with the onset of violence. 
Model 4 differs from Model 3 with the inclusion of a term expressed as a 
multiplicative interaction between the SMI variable and institutional authoritarian 
regimes (monarchies and one-party states). Institutional regimes and the 
SMI*Institutionalized Authoritarian Regimes interaction terms are both strongly 
significant (p < 0.05). The results of Model 4 demonstrate a strong statistically significant 
negative relationship between SMI and the onset of violence in institutional authoritarian 
regimes: as ICT rates rise in these particular states, violence appears to decrease. In 
contrast, the model shows that non-institutionalized authoritarian regimes seem to 
experience no such statistically significant pacifying effects from ICT penetration. As 
confirmed by several robustness checks, Model 4 is the most predictive model of the 
four, as it provides the best fit for the dataset employed in this part of the study. 
It is possible to visualize the rather strong, statistically significant, negative 
relationship between SMI and civil conflict onset (instability) from Model 2 in a rather 
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striking manner. By examining nearly all UN recognized, sovereign states from 1990 to 
2013, a general trend emerges. As SMI increases across countries, the onset of civil 
conflict decreases. This trend is reflected when strong democracies (polity2 score > 5) are 
compared with strong autocracies (polity2 score < -5), as shown in Figure 2. This figure 
illustrates the expected probability of civil conflict onset in strong democracies and 
strong autocracies for each year between 1990 and 2013, for all levels of SMI, when the 
control variables are held constant at their means. The shaded, semi-transparent color 
regions represent 95% confidence intervals for each estimated effect. There is little 
overlap of these standard area regions between strong democracies and strong autocracies 
except where SMI rates are at the extremes. 
Although the relationship between SMI and civil conflict onset is statistically 
significant, the difference in the rate of change between strong democracies and strong 
autocracies was not statistically significant. Several iterations of Model 2 (not shown in 
Table 1) were run to test the effect on civil conflict onset as SMI increased across country 
types. These tests included the use of multiplicative interactive terms with strong 
democracies and strong autocracies and even the inclusion of anocracies (countries with 
polity2 scores between -5 and 5) into the model, but to no avail. The non-statistically 
significant results suggest that categorizing states simply according to their polity2 score 
may not serve as the best method to predict civil conflict onset among groups of 
countries. 
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Figure 2.  Strong Democracies vs. Strong Autocracies 
 
Data for Figure 2 obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the 
CSP’s Polity IV Project dataset, Sambanis’ (2004) conflict dataset, and Geddes’ (2014) 
regime categorization dataset. 
Although Figure 2 presents an interesting visual phenomenon, it is necessary to 
compare institutionalized authoritarian regimes (monarchies and one-party) with non-
institutionalized authoritarian regimes (military and personal) to test and examine how 
these different forms of autocracies respond to increasing rates of ICT penetration. As 
depicted in Table 2, models 5, 6, and 7 use a reduced pool of data, only regimes 
identified as authoritarian, as compared to models 1, 2, 3, and 4. Model 5 serves as the 
base model, with only the five controls. Model 6 includes the five controls, the 
independent variable, SMI, and the institutionalized authoritarian regime term, consisting 
of monarchies and one-party states. Model 7 differs from Model 6 with the inclusion of 
the term expressed as a multiplicative interaction between the SMI variable and 
institutional authoritarian regimes.  
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Table 2.   Authoritarian Regressions – Civil Conflict Onset 
 
                                          Model 5         Model 6        Model 7 
SMI   -0.178** -0.064  
  (0.070) (0.085)  
     
GDP   -0.853** -0.413 -0.405  
 (0.380) (0.412) (0.409)  
     
Population    0.643***   0.757***    0.745***  
 (0.174) (0.180) (0.181)  
     
Mountains   0.209**   0.241**   0.237**  
 (0.095) (0.098) (0.098)  
     
Rural -0.006 -0.0001 0.0003  
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.010)  
     
Ethnic Frac    1.810***    1.659***    1.626***  
 (0.403) (0.409) (0.413)  




 -0.529**   -0.604***  
  (0.208) (0.217)  




  -0.324**  
   (0.139)  
     
Constant   5.229***   -7.434***   -7.374***  
 (1.966) (2.096) (2.083)  
     
 
Observations 1,494 1,478 1,478  
Log Likelihood -417.437 -398.103 -395.268  
Akaike Inf. Crit. 846.874 812.205 808.536  
 
Note: *p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01 
 
Data for Table 2 obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the 
CSP’s Polity IV Project dataset, Sambanis’ (2004) conflict dataset, and Geddes’ (2014) 
regime categorization dataset 
As illustrated in Figure 3, Model 7 demonstrates that regimes with 
institutionalized forms of succession, regardless of the degree of their authoritarianism 
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(polity2 score), experience decreasing conflict onset as ICT penetration increases. The 
decrease in internal violence is dramatic, dropping almost threefold from ICT inception 
to the high levels of ICT adoption in 2013. The relationship between SMI and conflict 
onset in authoritarian regimes without institutionalized forms of succession is noticeable 
but comparatively slight (an approximate 20% decrease), though the standard error 
(shaded, semi-transparent region) is high. This may indicate that the adoption of ICT in 
such regimes has little effect on conflict onset. Thus, these results support H5: Given 
their existing institutionalized succession mechanisms and their propensity to co-opt 
opposition forces, one-party regimes and monarchies will experience less internal 
violence, as compared to military and personal dictatorships, in the face of rising ICT 
rates. 
 
Figure 3.  Conflict Onset within Institutionalized and Non-Institutionalized 
Regimes 
 
Data for Figure 3 obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the 
CSP’s Polity IV Project dataset, Sambanis’ (2004) conflict dataset, and Geddes’ (2014) 
regime categorization dataset 
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The remaining control variables generally behave as expected, and their inclusion 
or exclusion does not alter the central results. As total population, percentage of land area 
covered by mountains, and ethnic fractionalization increases, state stability systematically 
decreases, to a statistically significant degree. These findings support previous work that 
quantitatively established the importance of such factors (Fearon, 2013). In contrast, the 
removal or addition of the rural population variable appears to have little predictive effect 
on the onset of violence across all models, though the rural population variable was 
marginally negatively associated with the onset of civil conflict across models 1 through 
5. This finding may suggest that rural locations pose less of a barrier to ICT penetration 
as compared to communication media of the past (Warren, 2014). Taken as a whole, the 
results suggest that SMI, the proxy for ICT penetration, can serve as a valid predictor of 
the onset of civil conflict within states. As depicted in Table 1, the results indicate that as 
SMI increases, state stability is also expected to increase.  
C. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
One way to measure the predictive capacity of a model is to use the Akaike 
information criterion (AIC). This measurement is displayed at the bottom row of Table 1 
and Table 2. AIC generates a score for a model’s predictive ability, or its ability to ‘fit’ a 
dataset, while penalizing it for its complexity (Akaike, 1974). Comparing the results from 
Model 1 with the results from the models that include the SMI term (models 2 through 4) 
demonstrates that accounting for ICT penetration within society enhances the ability to 
predict the onset of conflict within countries. A lower score represents better predictive 
ability, which, in this case, indicates that Model 4 (AIC = 1335) does a better job of 
predicting the onset of violence than models 1, 2, and 3, despite its increased complexity. 
Similarly, for the dataset analysis that included only authoritarian regimes, Model 7 (AIC 
= 808) does a better job of predicting the onset of violence than Model 5 (AIC = 846), 
which does not include the SMI variable. 
A second way to test whether SMI is a useful predictor of the dichotomous 
outcome of the onset of civil conflict within states or simply a proxy for other state 
capabilities, is the production of receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves for 
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models 5 through 7. ROC curves provide a graphical illustration of the performance of 
binary classification systems. They are a measure of the sensitivity (true-positive) as a 
function of the fall-out (false-positive) of a model. ROC curves provide a visual aid in 
determining which models perform better than others in predictive scenarios. The ROC 
curves for models 5 through 7 are shown in Figure 4. A common method to more 
accurately analyze the predictive power of models visualized using ROC curves is to 
measure the area under the curve (AUC). The greater the AUC, the more accurate the 
model. Although the models are highly accurate relative to one another, among the 
models that include the SMI term in the authoritarian regime dataset, Model 7 appears the 
most predictive with the greatest AUC value (0.743). Compared to Model 6 (AUC = 
0.740), Model 7 demonstrates a slight increase in predictive accuracy. All of the models 
that contain the SMI term demonstrate higher levels of predictive capacity as compared 
to Model 5 (AUC = 0.720), which does not contain the SMI term. 
 
Figure 4.  ROC Curves 
 
Data for Figure 4 obtained from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, the 
CSP’s Polity IV Project dataset, Sambanis’ (2004) conflict dataset, and Geddes’ (2014) 
regime categorization dataset. 
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D. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The various analyses conducted directly address the five hypotheses offered at the 
beginning of this study. The evidence indicates that authoritarian regimes have not 
suppressed the proliferation of ICT, but rather the Internet and cellular telephones have 
penetrated these closed societies to nearly the same extent as the world’s open 
democracies. Whether autocracies have embraced ICT or they have been unable to stem 
their advance, the presence of social media-enabling technology has not led to increased 
violence. In fact, as SMI rates rose, the onset of conflict decreased in strong autocracies 
to a much greater extent than in strong democracies. As hypothesized, autocracies with 
institutionalized succession mechanisms, regardless of their degree of authoritarianism, 
experienced a statistically significant decrease in the onset of conflict as SMI rates 
increased whereas non-institutionalized authoritarian regimes did not experience a 
corresponding decrease in violence. The development of increasingly complex models 
confirmed the usefulness of pre-existing factors that predict conflict onset within 
countries. The addition of the SMI term and the incorporation of the interaction between 
SMI and countries categorized as institutionalized regimes provides for an even more 
predictive modeling tool. 
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V. IMPLICATIONS AND PROJECTIONS 
This logistic regression analysis of the available empirical data provides evidence 
with a high degree of probability that a negative relationship exists between increasing 
levels of SMI diffusion and the onset of civil conflict (instability) within states. In other 
words, as ICT further penetrates states, those states appear to become more stable. This 
association is especially clear among states labeled as strong autocracies, and specifically 
amongst regimes with institutionalized succession mechanisms, regardless of the 
government’s degree of political openness. The relationship of Internet and cellular 
phone diffusion to the commencement of extreme mass violence, as observed during the 
period 1990 to 2013, appears to favor these authoritarian regimes. Among the various 
variables that serve as useful predictors of the onset of violence within states, SMI, a 
proxy for ICT, can be added as a statistically significant measure. 
Whereas the spread of modern communication and organizational mediums 
within democracies does not appear to substantially alter the probabilities of internal 
strife, these tools seem to empower dictators rather than their subjects. This finding is an 
essential avenue for further quantitative and qualitative research. Although the events of 
the Arab Spring might suggest that the use of ICT favors disaffected populations over 
their repressive governments, that sentiment is not borne out in this analysis. Further, the 
Arab Spring may have been a temporary, localized aberration. As much as ICT can be 
used for communication and organization, it can just as easily be used to censor and 
suppress. The measure used in the analysis to differentiate between democracies and 
autocracies and to rate their relative strengths (polity2) is itself an amalgam of several 
other state factors. Thus, to determine which regimes successfully suppress violence 
despite the spread of ICT, beyond the simple categorization of regimes with 
institutionalized succession mechanisms, it may prove useful to examine more specific 
characteristics such as the degree of freedom given to the press, the total amount of 
resources allocated to internal surveillance programs, and the percentage of GDP 
assigned to internal security forces. 
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As Figure 5 demonstrates, the Arab Spring did not herald the end of authoritarian 
regimes across the globe. Instead, the few governments that toppled in the Middle East 
were merely a part of the global trend that saw total authoritarian regime failures decrease 
from 1990 to the present. This period coincided with the global rise of ICT as depicted in 
Figure 1. This study does not assert that a direct correlation exists between ICT diffusion 
and the onset of violence within authoritarian regimes, but a relationship between the two 
seems plausible. It is worth examining in greater detail the composition and features of 
authoritarian regimes that allow them to leverage ICT characteristics to delay or prevent 
the onset of conflict. 
 
Figure 5.  Authoritarian Regime Failures 
 
Data for Figure 5 obtained from Geddes’ (2014) regime categorization dataset. 
Further still, future research could explore expanding the composition of the ICT 
proxy used in this analysis to create a more complex SMI term using specific forms of 
social media, such as Facebook, Twitter, Sina Weibo, FireChat, etc. All models of this 
analysis indicated that preexisting elements of ethnic fractionalization are strongly related 
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to the emergence of internal state conflict. Forms of identity cleavages and existing 
grievances may serve as better predictors of violence than the spread of ICT or the type 
of social media available to a disenfranchised group.  
Nevertheless, this study examines the relationship between the rise and spread of 
ICT and the onset of civil conflict during an era that begins with the introduction of the 
Internet and ends with cellular telephones becoming as ubiquitous in the third world as 
they are in the first world. The results indicate that as ICT adoption increases from zero 
per capita, authoritarian regimes become more adept at suppressing internal violence. 
What useful insight does this finding and the reasons for this phenomenon provide to 
governments, and the groups that wish to overthrow them, as ICT penetration rates 
continue to rise? Do the lessons from the results of this analysis remain pertinent to the 
few states where ICT have not universally penetrated society, are they transferable to 
states that experience the next communications revolution, or do they contain valuable 
insight into current information battles between states and non-state actors? One thing the 
results of this research have made abundantly clear is that the events of the Arab Spring 
did not portend an era of new forms of ICT giving absolute power to the people, but 
rather ICT enabled existing authoritarian regimes to solidify their hold on power to such a 
great extent that they were able to significantly reduce the incidents of major violence 
within their territories. While ICT unquestionably lowers the costs of coordination for 
repressed populations, the key to regime change still relies heavily on the physical ability 
to organize. As Hoffman stated when discussing the situation in Cuba, “The crucial fault-
line remains the physical space on the island, where the costs for individual voice and 
collective action remain high” (Cavatorta, 2012). 
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